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INTRODUCTION
A prisoner wants to file a lawsuit in federal court. After drafting a
complaint, he learns he has two options: pay the entire $350 filing
fee up front, or submit to an alternative arrangement whereby prison
officials will debit smaller monthly payments from his commissary
account. Unable to afford the entire fee at the start of proceedings,
he chooses the second option and files a poverty affidavit with the
court. Each month thereafter, as he earns wages for work performed
in the prison facility, an administrator forwards payment from his
account to the court clerk. Several months later, while still making
payments, he is released from prison. His inmate account no longer
exists, but he wants to continue his lawsuit. He has not yet paid off
the filing fee. What should happen next? Should he have to pay the
balance immediately? Should it be waived entirely? The answer
remains unclear.
The federal circuits have adopted varied interpretations of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), the provision of the Prison Litigation Reform
1
Act (PLRA) that defines a prisoner’s payment obligations when
initiating a civil lawsuit or filing an appeal. In an attempt to prevent
2
abuse of the federal judicial system, the PLRA eliminated state
3
funding for prisoner lawsuits. Previously, indigent prisoners could
1. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). Passed as a rider to the Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, the
PLRA became law on April 26, 1996. See generally Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation,
116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1558–59 (2003) (recounting the statute’s proposal and
passage).
2. See infra Part III.B.1 (summarizing the high incidence of frivolous prisoner
lawsuits in federal courts).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006) (mandating that all prisoners, even
impoverished ones, pay the full filing fee when commencing an action in district
court).
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apply for traditional in forma pauperis (IFP) status, which provides for
4
a waiver of the filing fee and certain other court-imposed costs.
Under the PLRA, however, all prisoners must now pay the full
5
amount of the filing fee, regardless of their eligibility for a waiver.
Thirteen years after the PLRA’s passage, the circuits have yet to agree
on how this requirement applies to prisoners who are released after
filing their complaint or notice of appeal but before completing
6
payment under the installment plan outlined in § 1915(b)(1)–(2).
The confusion lies in the statute’s mandate that payment be debited
7
over time from a prisoner’s institutional account.
Section
1915(b)(2) contemplates no other methods of payment and
therefore fails to explain how prisoners can satisfy the filing fee after
being released.
Faced with this issue soon after the statute’s enactment, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit opted not to apply the
PLRA’s payment requirements to prisoners released during the
8
pendency of their suit. Concerned that an alternative holding would
require prisoners to pay a large lump sum immediately upon release,
the court ruled to waive any remaining balance of the filing fee under
4. See infra Part I.B (discussing the origin and purpose of the IFP doctrine).
For purposes of this Comment, “traditional IFP status” refers to a waiver of the filing
fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the provision of the United States Code
predating and postdating the PLRA that regulates IFP procedures for non-prisoner
litigants.
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (replacing the waiver system with a repayment
plan for prisoners bringing civil actions).
6. See infra Part II (documenting the courts’ conflicting views of a released
prisoner’s continuing payment obligations under the PLRA). Courts have uniformly
agreed that the PLRA does not affect former prisoners who file a lawsuit after
release. See, e.g., Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
PLRA did not apply to an inmate who filed a civil rights action after he was released
on parole); see also Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1641 (“[T]he PLRA’s provisions
generally apply only to nonhabeas civil actions ‘brought’ by ‘prisoners’—that is, not
by former inmates or by inmates’ families or estates.”).
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (instructing courts to collect the filing fee
from funds in the prisoner’s commissary account). Since 1930, the Department of
Justice has created individual “bank type accounts” for federal inmates so that they
can purchase items at the prison commissary, which stocks food and other goods.
Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Money, http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/
money.jsp (last visited July 29, 2009). These accounts enable prison administrators
to “maintain inmates’ monies” during their incarceration. Id. Each facility records
prisoners’ account transactions, including purchases at the commissary and deposits
of wages earned from prison labor. Id. Inmates typically earn twelve to forty cents
per hour for maintenance work performed at their prison facility. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, Work Programs, http://www.bop.gov/inmate_programs/work_prgms.jsp
(last visited July 29, 2009). In addition, approximately eighteen percent of inmates
participate in the Federal Prison Industries (FPI) program and earn between
twenty-three cents and one dollar per hour while manufacturing metals, furniture,
electronics, and textiles. Id.
8. See infra Part II.A (describing the Second Circuit’s analysis of a released
prisoner’s payment obligations under the PLRA).
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9

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The United States Courts of Appeals for the
10
Fourth and Sixth Circuits later adopted similar holdings.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Seventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits, on the other hand, relied on what they
characterized as a plain reading of § 1915(b) to hold that the PLRA’s
payment mandate continues to apply after a prisoner’s release from
11
custody.
In these jurisdictions, despite shedding prisoner status
upon release, the litigant does not shed the obligation to pay the full
12
Thus, released prisoners find themselves caught
filing fee.
somewhere between the jailhouse and courthouse doors, even
though they are no longer under the care of the state and must
13
assume the same financial responsibilities as non-prisoners.
This Comment argues that, based on the PLRA’s purpose and
legislative history, prisoners who fulfilled the statute’s payment
obligations while incarcerated should be entitled to apply for
traditional IFP status under § 1915(a)(1) upon release. Part I traces
the historical development of prisoners’ right of access to the courts
and its ties to the IFP doctrine. It then examines the PLRA’s many
amendments to the federal IFP statute. Part II explains the divergent
readings that circuit courts currently apply to § 1915(b). After
analyzing the statute’s plain language and legislative history, Part III
concludes that Congress sought to impose the filing fee requirement
on prisoners because they encounter fewer financial and logistical
obstacles throughout the litigation process, a justification that cannot
extend to released inmates. Finally, Part IV recommends that courts
decide the continuing application of the PLRA on a case-by-case basis
that first takes into account a released prisoner’s prior compliance
with the payment formula, a solution that upholds both the
prisoner’s constitutional right of access and the countervailing
government interests.

9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B (explaining that these circuits consider a prisoner’s
payment obligations under § 1915(b) to attach at the time of filing, making his
subsequent release irrelevant).
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part III.B (comparing the litigation and living expenses incurred by
prisoners and non-prisoners).
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BACKGROUND

A. The Constitutional Right of Access to the Courts
The Supreme Court granted new rights to prisoners in a series of
14
15
historic cases beginning in 1940. First, Ex parte Hull established the
right of inmates to file petitions in federal court to challenge the
16
legality and conditions of their confinement. Despite this ruling,
many courts still hesitated to interfere with the practices of prison
17
18
administrators. Several years later in Cooper v. Pate, however, the
Supreme Court signaled the end of this “hands-off” policy by
authorizing state inmates to seek damages for civil rights violations in
19
federal court.
20
In 1969, Johnson v. Avery reaffirmed and extended inmates’ right
of access to the courts by invalidating a Tennessee regulation that
prohibited prisoners from providing legal advice or services to one
21
another.
The Court reasoned that the rule effectively forbade
14. See Jennifer Winslow, Comment, The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Physical
Injury Requirement Bars Meritorious Lawsuits: Was It Meant To?, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1655,
1678 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court, in the sixty years prior to the passage of the
PLRA, gradually built up the cadre of civil rights afforded to inmates in the nations’
prisons.”). See generally JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
145–47 (8th ed. 2006) (tracing the history of prisoner access to the federal court
system).
15. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
16. See id. at 642 (invalidating a state prison regulation that required a prisoner
to submit all legal documents to a prison official for examination and censorship
before he filed them with the court on the ground that “the state and its officers may
not abridge or impair petitioner’s right to apply to a federal court for a writ of
habeas corpus”).
17. See United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1956)
(“[I]t is well settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the
treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries . . . .” (quoting Stroud v.
Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851–52 (9th Cir. 1951))); United States ex rel. Palmer v. Ragen,
159 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1947) (“Under repeated decisions, state governmental
bodies, who are charged with prosecution and punishment of offenders, are not to
be interfered with except in case of extraordinary circumstances.” (quoting Davis v.
Dowd, 119 F.2d 338, 338 (7th Cir. 1941))); TODD R. CLEAR ET AL., AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS 101 (7th ed. 2006) (commenting that courts maintained a “hands-off”
policy with respect to corrections and refused to set standards for the treatment of
prisoners by claiming that they lacked the authority and the expertise to do so).
18. 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam).
19. See id. at 546 (granting state prison inmates standing to sue in federal court to
address their grievances under the Civil Rights Act of 1871); see also 1 MICHAEL B.
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1.03 (2d ed. 1993) (describing a variety of
developments in the federal judiciary and the American political system that
combined “to shake the foundations” of the hands-off doctrine in the 1960s).
20. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
21. See id. at 490 (“[U]nless and until the State provides some reasonable
alternative to assist inmates in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief,
it may not validly enforce a regulation . . . barring inmates from furnishing such
assistance to other prisoners.”).
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illiterate and non-English-speaking prisoners from filing habeas
corpus petitions because they were incapable of drafting petitions
22
without the aid of other inmates. Eight years later, the Supreme
23
Court broadened prisoner access even further in Bounds v. Smith, a
landmark case in which the Court imposed an affirmative duty on
prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of
legal documents by providing adequate law libraries or adequate
24
assistance from persons trained in the law. In essence, the decision
required that prisoners receive “a reasonably adequate opportunity to
present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
25
courts.” The Court explained that states could fulfill this obligation
by providing items such as paper, writing utensils, notary services,
26
stamps, funds to pay for transcripts, and court-appointed attorneys.
At different times since the inception of the right to court access,
the Supreme Court has identified its source as the Due Process
27
28
29
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the First Amendment.
In recent years, the circuit courts have upheld restrictions on the
availability of legal resources in prisons in order to maintain security
30
31
and internal order, prevent the introduction of contraband, and
22. See id. at 487 (finding that the statute amounted to a denial of access to the
courts).
23. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
24. See id. at 822 (mandating that prisoners receive “adequate, effective, and
meaningful” access).
25. Id. at 825.
26. Id. at 824–25. Several decades later, the Court refuted the idea that prisoners
have an absolute right to adequate prison libraries or legal services in Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 356 (1996). According to the majority in Lewis, Bounds “guarantees no
particular methodology” but rather the more general right of access to the courts.
Id. Nevertheless, even under this more restrictive interpretation, prisoners still retain
a fundamental right to access the courts to pursue direct appeals from the
convictions for which they are incarcerated, to present habeas corpus petitions, and
to bring actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge conditions of their
confinement. Id. at 354–55.
27. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974) (“The right of access to
the courts . . . is founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will
be denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations concerning
violations of fundamental constitutional rights.”), overruled on other grounds by Sandin
v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
28. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (referencing the
“equal protection guarantee of ‘meaningful access’” to the courts).
29. See, e.g., Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (describing
the right of access to the courts as “an aspect of the First Amendment right to
petition the Government for redress of grievances”).
30. See Caldwell v. Miller, 790 F.2d 589, 606 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that
legitimate security concerns during a post-riot lockdown that resulted in the death of
an inmate and two guards justified temporary restrictions on inmates’ access to
library materials).
31. See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 608–10 (6th Cir. 1993) (authorizing
prison officials to open and inspect packages from inmates’ attorneys).

2009]

OUT OF JAIL . . . BUT STILL NOT FREE TO LITIGATE?

1539

32

manage budgetary needs.
Nevertheless, in the absence of such
administrative concerns, courts continue to recognize prisoners’ right
33
of access as a fundamental constitutional entitlement. To overcome
the financial obstacles that would otherwise prevent them from
exercising this right, most prisoners petition for IFP status when filing
34
suit.
B. IFP Proceedings in Federal Courts Before the PLRA
To commence a civil lawsuit in federal district court, the initiating
35
party must prepay a filing fee. Although the Constitution does not
36
guarantee free access to the courts in all cases, prior to 1996 almost
all courts had a statutory or administrative procedure excusing the
payment of judicial costs and fees for any indigent litigant, including
37
prisoners.
32. See Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1308 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that prison
authorities may reasonably attempt to limit inmates’ use of the mail system in light of
budgetary cutbacks).
33. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) (“Because a prisoner
ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote, the right to file a court action might be
said to be his remaining most ‘fundamental political right, because [sic] preservative
of all rights.’” (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886))); Beville v.
Ednie, 74 F.3d 210, 212 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A prison inmate’s right of access to the
courts is the most fundamental right he or she holds.” (quoting DeMallory v. Cullen,
855 F.2d 442, 446 (7th Cir. 1988))); Adams v. Carlson, 488 F.2d 619, 630 (7th Cir.
1973) (“[A]n inmate’s right of unfettered access to the courts is as fundamental a
right as any other he may hold. . . . All other rights of an inmate are illusory without
it, being entirely dependent for their existence on the whim or caprice of the prison
warden.”).
34. See Jody L. Sturtz, Comment, A Prisoner’s Privilege to File In forma pauperis
Proceedings: May It Be Numerically Restricted?, 1995 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV.
1349, 1351 (1995) (“Since a vast majority of inmates are indigent, the constitutional
right to access would be meaningless without the In forma pauperis Statute.”).
35. Parties instituting a civil action in federal district court must pay a filing fee of
$350. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006). To appeal a judgment of the district court,
appellants must prepay a filing fee of $450. 28 U.S.C. § 1913 (2006).
36. The Supreme Court has mandated waivers of filing fees in civil cases only
where the litigant has a fundamental interest at stake. Compare Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380–83 (1971) (invalidating a Connecticut statute that
required payment of pretrial fees as a condition precedent to initiating a divorce
proceeding), and M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 124–28 (1996) (classifying the right
to maintain ties with one’s children as fundamental and holding that Mississippi state
courts could not impose fees that prevented indigent parents from obtaining
appellate review of a judicial termination of their guardianship rights), with United
States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 450 (1973) (refusing to recognize a fundamental right of
access for the purpose of obtaining a discharge of one’s debts in bankruptcy and
declining to adopt “an unlimited rule that an indigent at all times and in all cases has
the right to relief without the payment of fees”). The types of fundamental interests
that can trigger IFP assistance extend beyond the family context. See supra note 33
and accompanying text (noting that courts have recognized prisoners’ fundamental
interest in being able to vindicate their constitutional rights through litigation).
37. For example, state legislatures enacted statutes to facilitate court access
“[e]arly in this country’s history.” Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts:
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Congress passed the original federal IFP statute in 1892, thereby
giving courts the discretionary power to permit indigent plaintiffs to
38
initiate civil actions without first paying a filing fee. By enacting the
statute, Congress sought “to guarantee that no citizen [would] be
denied an opportunity to commence, prosecute, or defend an action,
civil or criminal, ‘in any court of the United States’ solely because his
39
poverty [made] it impossible for him to pay or secure the costs.”
Until the PLRA, subsequent versions of this statute allowed qualifying
indigent litigants, prisoners and non-prisoners alike, to bypass the
40
filing fee when bringing a civil suit.
No repayment provision
existed, and federal courts could bestow the IFP designation on any
litigant who, in good faith, filed a poverty affidavit and demonstrated
41
an inability to pay fees.
When applying the IFP statute, courts have attempted to balance
the interest of the state in collecting fees with the interest of indigent
42
citizens in presenting their grievances. IFP status has never been
The In Forma Pauperis Statute—Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 413
(1985).
38. Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, § 1, 27 Stat. 252, 252 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006)).
39. Adkins v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 342 (1948).
Congress desired that the government not prohibit indigent citizens from litigating a
case “because they happen to be without the money to advance pay to the tribunals
of justice.” Feldman, supra note 37, at 413–14 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 52-1079, at 2
(1892)).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1994) (amended 1996) (“Any court of the United
States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action
or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and
costs or security therefor . . . .”).
41. See id. (requiring IFP applicants to submit an affidavit that described their
assets, liabilities, and employment opportunities and stated the nature of the action).
In an effort to prevent fraud, courts required the supporting affidavit to state facts
concerning the plaintiff’s poverty with some level of “particularity, definiteness, and
certainty.” Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
Courts also retained the authority to deny IFP status if a plaintiff deliberately failed to
report available assets. See, e.g., Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 936 F.2d 512,
517–19 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming the lower court’s denial of IFP status because it
appeared that the applicant had access to an unknown amount of money either
through his family, his extortion activities, or his legal work on behalf of fellow
inmates). But see Acevedo v. Reid, 653 F. Supp. 347, 348–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(excusing an inmate’s failure to report his veterans’ benefits and prison salary on his
application for IFP status where (1) there was no evidence that he had acted in bad
faith, and (2) he would have been eligible for IFP status even if those assets were
taken into account). Similarly, courts could deny IFP status if they found that an
applicant had intentionally depleted his resources in order to qualify for a fee waiver.
See, e.g., Collier v. Tatum, 722 F.2d 653, 655 (11th Cir. 1983) (authorizing the lower
court to examine the plaintiff’s financial dealings during the time period
immediately preceding the filing of the suit to determine whether he had
intentionally shifted or wasted assets that he otherwise could have used to finance the
action).
42. Compare Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973) (per curiam)
(upholding a filing fee requirement in Oregon in part because it helped the state
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recognized as a constitutional right; rather, courts characterize it as a
congressionally created benefit that can be extended or limited by
43
the legislature. At the same time, federal courts have never required
44
that a litigant be absolutely destitute to qualify for IFP assistance.
For example, an applicant made a sufficient showing of poverty to
proceed IFP by testifying that she had been unemployed for two
years, received $163 per month in Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) benefits and a $385 housing subsidy, had no cash
45
or savings account, and resided with her fourteen-year-old daughter.
Recognizing that IFP litigants lack an economic deterrent from
filing meritless complaints, Congress previously enabled federal
courts to dismiss frivolous or malicious lawsuits in an effort to prevent
46
potential abuse of § 1915.
Despite that provision, prisoners
increasingly exploited the statute to file repetitive and often frivolous
47
lawsuits against prison officials at the states’ expense. Eventually, in
court system offset some of its operating costs), with Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339 (holding
that the ability to pay does not require that plaintiffs contribute “the last dollar they
have or can get, and thus make themselves and their dependents wholly destitute”).
43. See United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (“[T]he
expenditure of public funds [on behalf of an indigent litigant] is proper only when
authorized by Congress . . . .”).
44. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 893 F. Supp. 643, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (“An affidavit
to proceed in forma pauperis is sufficient if it states that one cannot, because of
poverty, afford to pay for the costs of litigation and still provide for him or herself
and any dependents.” (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339)).
45. Tatum v. Cmty. Bank, 866 F. Supp. 988, 994 (E.D. Tex. 1994). Some
decisions in the last several decades have sought to limit the scope of the federal IFP
statute by distinguishing between direct and indirect barriers to court access.
See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 112 F.R.D. 183, 185 (1986) (holding that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 does not require the government to advance funds for deposition expenses
because the statute only seeks to provide indigent parties with a reasonable
opportunity to litigate their claims); Johnson v. Hubbard, 698 F.2d 286, 288–90
(6th Cir. 1983) (suggesting that a state’s refusal to waive the costs of transcripts,
expert witness fees, or fees to secure depositions does not deny or infringe on a
person’s right of access to the courts because it does not totally bar him or her from
bringing a case). Thus, some courts waive only mandatory costs that affect a litigant’s
ability to physically access the courtroom. See, e.g., Crowder v. Sinyard, 884 F.2d 804,
811 (5th Cir. 1989) (“In its most obvious and formal manifestation, the right [of
access] protects one’s physical access to the courts.”); Johnson, 698 F.2d at 288–90
(differentiating between actual access to the courts and procedures involved in the
trial process such as depositions and transcripts). See generally Robert F. Koets,
Annotation, What Constitutes “Fees” or “Costs” Within Meaning of Federal Statutory
Provision (28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 and Similar Predecessor Statutes) Permitting Party to Proceed
In Forma Pauperis Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs or Security Therefor, 142 A.L.R.
FED. 627 (1998) (analyzing federal cases in which courts have determined whether
particular expenses fall within the scope of the IFP statute).
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1994) (amended 1996) (giving courts discretionary
power to dismiss an IFP proceeding “if satisfied that the action [was] frivolous or
malicious”).
47. See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (lamenting that
“[m]any prisoners filing lawsuits today in Federal court claim indigent status” and
that they therefore experience “no economic disincentive to going to court”).
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response to remarkably high filing rates in the 1980s and 1990s,
48
Congress resolved to completely transform the IFP program.
C. The Amended Language of the Federal IFP Statute
Introduced as an amendment to the Civil Rights of
49
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), the PLRA modified and
supplemented the U.S. Code in a number of ways to restrict prisoner
50
litigation. It redesigned the statutory subsections of § 1915 so that
all prisoners bringing a civil action, even indigent ones, must pay the
51
full filing fee. The statute states in pertinent part:
48. See infra Part III.B.1 (documenting the statistical and anecdotal evidence of
prisoner filing rates that prompted passage of the PLRA).
49. Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997 (2006)). The CRIPA provides a statutory basis for the United States Attorney
General to conduct litigation on behalf of institutionalized citizens. See id.
§ 1997a(a).
Congress enacted the statute in 1980 in response to alleged
constitutional rights violations in “prisons, jails, mental health facilities, and other
[confinement] institutions throughout the country.” Lynn S. Branham, The Prison
Litigation Reform Act’s Enigmatic Exhaustion Requirement: What It Means and What
Congress, Courts and Correctional Officials Can Learn From It, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 483,
493 (2001).
50. Specifically, the PLRA requires prisoners to exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing suit, places strict limitations on attorneys’ fees, precludes
compensatory damage awards for mental or emotional injuries, and allows for
revocation of prisoners’ good time credits in certain instances. See Schlanger, supra
note 1, at 1627–32 (discussing the statute’s new procedural mandates and limitations
on recovery). Many commentators have criticized the statute for the restrictions it
places on prisoners’ ability to challenge conditions of their confinement in court.
See Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act:
The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 1779 (2003) (“[T]he PLRA
met a predominantly hostile academic reaction and a large number of court
challenges.”). In February 2007, the American Bar Association’s general policymaking body passed a resolution urging Congress to repeal or amend certain
sections of the PLRA. See ROBERT M.A. JOHNSON, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT
HOUSE OF DELEGATES
(2007),
http://www.savecoalition.org/
TO
THE
americanbar.html (listing proposed amendments and contending that Congress
never fully vetted the statute’s implications). Despite these criticisms, however,
“the statute has survived judicial scrutiny essentially unchanged.” Roosevelt, supra, at
1778.
51. See Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 241 (5th Cir. 1997)
(“Under the PLRA, a prisoner is not entitled to commence an action or file an
appeal without prepayment in some form (§ 1915(b)(2)), a privilege afforded to
non-prisoners under § 1915(a)(1).”); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604
(6th Cir. 1997) (“Pauper status for inmates, as we previously knew it, no longer
exists.”). Courts had begun to condition IFP status on payment of a partial filing fee,
calculated in accordance with various formulas, even prior to the passage of the
PLRA. See In re Epps, 888 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1989) (remarking that a district
court’s power to waive the entire filing fee includes the power to waive only a portion
of it); Lumbert v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 827 F.2d 257, 260 (7th Cir. 1987) (affirming the
dismissal of an inmate’s civil rights suit when he failed to pay a $7.20 partial filing
fee); Smith v. Martinez, 706 F.2d 572, 573 (5th Cir. 1983) (ruling that the district
court had discretion to require an indigent prisoner to pay at least minimal service
and filing fees where data of his present assets showed that he could do so without
undue financial hardship); Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521, 524 (4th Cir. 1981)
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[I]f a prisoner brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma
pauperis, the prisoner shall be required to pay the full amount of a
filing fee. The court shall assess and, when funds exist, collect, as a
partial payment of any court fees required by law, an initial partial
filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (A) the average monthly
deposits to the prisoner’s account; or (B) the average monthly
balance in the prisoner’s account for the 6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of
52
appeal.

The statute further provides:
After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be
required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding
month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The agency
having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from the
prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount
53
in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.

Thus, inmates must either pay the entire filing fee at the initiation
of the proceeding or apply for revised IFP status and proceed under
the strict installment plan set forth in § 1915(b)(1)–(2). The latter
option requires an inmate to pay an initial partial filing fee from
54
funds in his inmate account. Once he pays the initial partial filing
fee in full, the prisoner must make installment payments equal to
twenty percent of his preceding month’s income, as long as that
55
amount exceeds ten dollars. For example, if a prisoner maintains
an average monthly account balance of twenty dollars for the six
months preceding the filing of his complaint, he would have to pay
twenty percent of that amount, or four dollars, as an initial partial
filing fee. Thereafter, assuming that the prisoner continues to
accumulate twenty dollars in his account each month, he would pay
four-dollar installments for roughly eighty-eight months to satisfy the
$350 filing fee.

(finding nothing impermissible in compelling a prisoner to make “some partial
contribution” out of resources from his commissary account, accumulated either
from earnings or private resources); In re Stump, 449 F.2d 1297, 1298 (1st Cir. 1971)
(requiring a state prisoner who had a $218 cash credit with the prison warden to pay
a $15 filing fee in a civil rights action arising out of his parole revocation).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006).
53. Id. § 1915(b)(2).
54. Id. § 1915(b)(1). The amended statute requires prisoners to eventually pay
the initial partial filing fee even if they lack financial resources at the time they file
the complaint or appeal. See id. (instructing courts to collect the initial partial filing
fee “when funds exist”). Therefore, if funds accumulate in a prisoner’s account at a
later date, the prison administrator must immediately forward that money to the
court, even if it amounts to less than ten dollars. Id.
55. Id. § 1915(b)(2).
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The PLRA also demands more detailed documentation of a
prisoner’s indigent status than previous versions of the IFP statute
56
demanded. In addition, courts can charge a prisoner who loses a
57
case for the full costs related to the action. The process for a nonincarcerated indigent litigant remains the same as before the PLRA’s
58
enactment. Thus, if a non-prisoner moves for traditional IFP status
under
§ 1915(a)(1), the court can waive the filing fee as long as the litigant
59
demonstrates a lack of financial resources. While trial courts retain
broad discretion in assessing an IFP applicant’s indigency, the PLRA
mandates dismissal upon a finding that the litigant falsified his
poverty affidavit; the suit is frivolous or malicious; the complaint fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or the litigant seeks
60
monetary relief against a defendant who qualifies for immunity.
Courts handle the timing of the indigency and frivolity
61
determinations differently.
56. See id. § 1915(a)(2) (requiring submission of “a certified copy of the trust
fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month
period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal,
obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the prisoner is or was
confined”).
57. Id. § 1915(f)(2)(A). Courts retain discretion to excuse the payment of costs.
See, e.g., Culp v. Zaccagnino, No. 96 CIV 3280, 2000 WL 35861, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 18, 2000) (declining to assess costs in the amount of $2,693.85 against a prisoner
who had no checking accounts, stocks or bonds and had only $0.12 in his
commissary account).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (“[A]ny court of the United States may authorize
the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil
or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a
person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner
possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.”).
The section’s use of the phrase “statement of all assets such prisoner possesses” does
not preclude non-prisoners from proceeding IFP in federal court but rather appears
to be a typographical error by which Congress substituted “prisoner” for “person.”
See Floyd v. U.S. Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 275–76 (6th Cir. 1997) (reaching this
conclusion in light of the statute’s purpose to curtail inmate litigation, the
grammatical structure of the paragraph, and the general references to a “person”
before and after the “prisoner” reference).
59. See supra Part I.B (describing the scope of the pre-PLRA IFP procedure).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(A)–(B).
61. In order to create an adequate record for appeal, most circuits conduct a
two-step inquiry that begins with an examination of the applicant’s affidavit of
poverty. See, e.g., McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997)
(remarking that under the PLRA courts must initially examine a prisoner’s financial
status before considering the merits of his complaint), abrogated on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). If the court grants IFP status, it then evaluates
the substance of the complaint. Id. at 608. In contrast, some courts review the
petitioner’s IFP application while simultaneously deciding the merits of his claim.
See, e.g., Carson v. Tulsa Police Dep’t, 266 Fed. App’x 763, 766–67 (10th Cir. 2008)
(declining to decide whether the PLRA’s payment requirements apply to a released
prisoner and instead concluding that the plaintiff’s complaint was frivolous).
Under this approach, the court automatically denies IFP status upon a finding that
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Additionally, the PLRA neither defines “civil action” nor expressly
62
excludes habeas corpus proceedings from its scope. However, most
courts have determined that habeas corpus and other post-judgment
proceedings challenging criminal convictions or sentences do not
63
constitute civil actions for purposes of the PLRA.
Courts have
further reasoned that the PLRA’s provisions apply to mandamus and
other extraordinary writs when the relief sought is similar to that in a
64
civil action, but not when the writ concerns criminal matters. As a
general rule, the PLRA’s fee requirements for a “civil action” apply
primarily to cases where prisoners seek to challenge conditions of
65
their confinement.
II. THE CONFLICT AMONG FEDERAL COURTS:
DIVERGENT READINGS OF § 1915(b)
Congress failed to articulate a payment procedure for litigants
released after filing a complaint or notice of appeal, and, as a result,
the circuits have had to decide whether released prisoners should be
liable for the full amount of the filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1) in
66
the same way as those who remain incarcerated. The Fifth, Seventh,
the claim is frivolous or malicious and thereby dismisses the case. See, e.g., Carson,
266 Fed. App’x at 767 (dismissing the plaintiff’s civil rights complaint without
evaluating his eligibility for revised IFP status under the PLRA). Courts utilize the
one-step procedure in part because it “helps minimize the drain on public funds and
judicial resources that in forma pauperis litigants might otherwise cause.” Feldman,
supra note 37, at 425.
62. See Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
63. See, e.g., Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 636–37 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on
other courts’ analyses of the legislative history of the PLRA, which “supports a clear
line between civil actions attacking conditions of confinement (subject to the PLRA)
and habeas corpus petitions attacking the fact or duration of confinement (subject to
the rules governing habeas corpus)”).
64. Compare In re Jacobs, 213 F.3d 289, 291 (5th Cir. 2000) (characterizing a
petition for mandamus as a civil action for purposes of the PLRA’s three strikes
provision), and In re Crittenden, 143 F.3d 919, 920 (5th Cir. 1998) (barring a plaintiff
with three dismissals from seeking a writ of mandamus without the payment of fees),
with Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d 853, 855 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a
petition for a writ of mandamus in a criminal proceeding is not a civil action for the
purposes of § 1915(b)(1)).
65. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 755 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the
PLRA applies to claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal
Torts Claims Act, most of which concern prison conditions).
66. The question of § 1915’s applicability to released prisoners continually arises
in the federal court system. For example, courts in the Tenth Circuit have recently
discussed the issue but dismissed relevant cases on other grounds. See Carson, 266
Fed. App’x at 766–67 (declining to decide the issue and dismissing the case as
frivolous); Hobbs v. El Paso County, No. 07-00434, 2008 WL 2787246, at *4–5
(D. Colo. July 16, 2008) (identifying the circuit split but dismissing the action due to
the plaintiff’s failure to file court-ordered documents). Courts have also differed
over the application of other PLRA provisions to prisoners released after filing a
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and D.C. Circuits have held that the obligation to pay the fee arises at
the time of filing and continues upon release because of specific
language in the first sentence of § 1915(b)(1), namely the term
67
“prisoner” and the phrase “brings a civil action.”
The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, on the other hand, have
reasoned that because the rest of § 1915(b)(1) and all of
§ 1915(b)(2) refer exclusively to the litigant’s inmate account, the
68
installment plan can only apply to those who remain incarcerated.
With no indication from Congress as to the proper mechanism by
which to collect payment in this scenario, these circuits allow released
prisoners to apply to proceed under the provision of the IFP statute
69
applicable to non-prisoners: § 1915(a)(1).
Thus, the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have focused their
analyses on the inconsistencies in the installment plan, while the
Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have ascribed greater importance to
70
the mandate of § 1915(b)(1) that prisoners pay the full filing fee.
These decisions demonstrate the difficulty in trying to give indigent
prisoners an adequate opportunity to litigate a case while also
maintaining the integrity of the judicial system. As discussed in
Part IV, requiring former prisoners to meet all past due obligations
complaint or notice of appeal. Compare Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 973–76
(11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (holding that plaintiffs released after filing a lawsuit
remain prisoners for purposes of the PLRA’s physical injury requirement), and
Becker v. Vargo, No. 02-7380, 2004 WL 1068779, at *3 (D. Or. Feb. 17, 2004)
(holding that plaintiffs released after filing a lawsuit remain prisoners for purposes of
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement), with Dennison v. Prison Health Serv.,
No. 00-266, 2001 WL 761218, at *2–3 (D. Me. July 6, 2001) (holding the opposite
with respect to the exhaustion requirement), and Murphy v. Magnusson, No. 98-439,
1999 WL 615895, at *3 (D. Me. July 27, 1999) (holding that a former prisoner need
not exhaust administrative remedies after his release from custody). Unlike the
physical injury and exhaustion requirements, which must be satisfied either before or
at the time of filing, the IFP provision involves a continuing obligation. Compare 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006) (precluding prisoners from filing federal civil actions “for
mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury”), and id. § 1997e(a) (requiring prisoners to exhaust all available
administrative remedies before filing suit), with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (2006)
(requiring inmates to pay the filing fee in installments over an indefinite period).
67. See, e.g., Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir.
1997) (emphasizing the litigant’s incarceration status at the time he filed his appeal).
68. See McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996)
(reasoning that the detailed mechanism Congress created for implementing the
payment obligation—deductions from prison accounts—demonstrates that it
expected the requirement to apply to a prisoner who remains incarcerated).
69. See id. at 30 (“A released prisoner may litigate without further prepayment of
fees upon satisfying the poverty affidavit requirement applicable to all nonprisoners.”).
70. Compare id. (suggesting the difficulties continuing fee obligations impose on
indigent released prisoners), with Gay, 117 F.3d at 241 (describing the revised IFP
procedure for prisoner-plaintiffs as a necessary “front-end deterrent” that came in
response to a congressional desire to reduce frivolous filings in federal courts).
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under the PLRA achieves the proper balance between these
competing interests.
A. The Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits Have Authorized
§ 1915(a)(1)’s Application to Released Prisoners
Emphasizing the inconsistencies in § 1915(b)’s installment plan,
the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits have endorsed pre-PLRA IFP
eligibility for released prisoners. The Second Circuit first adopted
71
this position in McGann v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration,
holding that a prisoner’s obligation to pay the remainder of the filing
fee upon release depends solely on whether he qualifies for a
72
traditional IFP waiver under § 1915(a)(1).
McGann filed his
complaint while he was a New York state prisoner and challenged a
policy of the Social Security Administration denying certain benefits
73
to inmates. On appeal, the court required that McGann either pay
the required fees, move anew for leave to proceed IFP, or authorize
his former prison to release his prison account information and debit
74
the payments owed under the PLRA’s installment plan. Responding
by letter, McGann contended that because he had been released
from prison, he qualified for IFP status under § 1915(a)(1), as
opposed to § 1915(b), and was therefore excused from complying
75
with the PLRA’s requirements.
In considering whether McGann had a continued obligation to pay
the filing fee, the court found that § 1915(b)(1)–(2) creates “a facial
76
inconsistency” as applied to released prisoners. According to the
court, the statute “broadly” states that “a prisoner who files an appeal
‘shall be required’ to pay filing fees” but in the very next sentence
mandates that the payment amounts be calculated as percentages of
77
the balances of, or deposits into, the prisoner’s account. Because
McGann was no longer a prisoner, there was no account from which
78
to calculate and debit the required payments. The court reasoned
that because the statute ties payment to the existence and amount of
a prisoner’s commissary account, it could not apply the law without
79
such an account. Thus, the court concluded that “a literal reading
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

96 F.3d 28 (2d Cir. 1996).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
Id.
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of all provisions of the PLRA, as applied to released prisoners, [was]
80
not possible.”
The Second Circuit then proposed that § 1915(b) means either
that (1) if released, the prisoner must immediately pay the entire
remaining amount of the filing fee; or (2) the prisoner must make
the installment payments only while incarcerated, and that, upon his
81
release, he can qualify for traditional IFP status under § 1915(a)(1).
The court ultimately selected the second construction because,
although § 1915(b)(1) specifies that a prisoner “shall” pay the full
filing fee, the detailed mechanism Congress created for
implementing that obligation by debiting prison accounts
demonstrated that it “expected the new payment requirement to
82
apply to a prisoner who remains incarcerated.” According to the
court, the alternative reading would mean that the litigant would
have to pay the entire balance of the fee in a single payment upon
release from prison, “a result that would be more onerous than that
83
imposed on those who remain incarcerated.”
Later cases in the Second Circuit and other jurisdictions have
construed this decision to mean that a prisoner’s release relieves him
of any liability for the balance of the filing fee, regardless of whether
he made all required payments under the installment scheme during
84
his incarceration. Thus, under this rationale, a released prisoner
may litigate without further payment of fees upon satisfying the
85
poverty affidavit requirement applicable to all non-prisoners.
At least one court in the Eighth Circuit has adopted the McGann
rationale in a decision regarding a prisoner’s continuing obligations
86
under the PLRA. The Sixth Circuit has also applied the McGann
80. Id. at 30.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Recently, one court in the Ninth Circuit has gone so far as to require full
payment immediately upon a prisoner’s release without creating any kind of
specialized schedule. See Murphy v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, No. 05-2553,
2005 WL 3273573, at *1 (D. Ariz. Dec. 1, 2005) (holding that the plaintiff could not
avail himself of the partial payment provisions of § 1915(b)(1)–(2) upon release and
therefore had to pay the filing fee in full within thirty days).
84. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[T]he
mandatory payment provisions of § 1915(b) . . . do not apply to a released
prisoner.”).
85. See McGann, 96 F.3d at 29–30 (reasoning that if a prisoner were to have
continuing payment obligations upon release, he would be obligated to pay the
balance of the fees in full at that time because his prison account would be closed,
thus cutting off the source provided in the PLRA for collection of the installment
payments).
86. See Lewis v. Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 07-3012, 2007 WL 2123753, at *1 (D. Neb.
July 20, 2007) (citing McGann, 96 F.3d at 30) (holding that the plaintiff, a released
prisoner being held at a mental hospital at the time of trial, was not required to pay

2009]

OUT OF JAIL . . . BUT STILL NOT FREE TO LITIGATE?

1549

ruling, finding that it provides an efficient resolution of the
87
procedural issues created by § 1915(b)(1)–(2).
While still recognizing a released prisoner’s eligibility for
traditional IFP status, the Fourth Circuit retreated from McGann’s
88
broad holding in DeBlasio v. Gilmore. Upon receiving DeBlasio’s IFP
application, the district court required him to pay the full filing fee in
installments from funds in his commissary account pursuant to the
89
PLRA.
The court directed DeBlasio to pay $11.37 as the initial
portion of his filing fee, and he forwarded $12 to the court clerk soon
90
after.
Two months later, when the court learned of DeBlasio’s
release from prison, it directed him to pay the rest of the filing fee
91
DeBlasio sought traditional IFP status under
within thirty days.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), pleading that he had insufficient assets to pay
the remaining balance; however, the district court dismissed the
92
action without considering his application.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal, holding that
a prisoner who has no outstanding debts under the PLRA’s
installment plan and who is released before paying the entire filing
fee does not have to pay the remaining balance; rather, the litigant
93
should apply for a waiver under § 1915(a)(1). Because DeBlasio
had paid the requisite initial partial filing fee and was released from
prison before any subsequent payment obligations under the
installment plan came due, he could apply for traditional IFP
94
assistance. According to the court, “[a] released prisoner should
not have to shoulder a more difficult financial burden than the

the unpaid balance of the filing fee for his case). But see Williams v. Doe #1,
No. 06-1344, 2006 WL 3804027, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2006) (citing In re Smith,
114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997)) (holding that § 1915(b)(1) continues to apply
after a prisoner’s release).
87. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612–13 (6th Cir. 1997)
(recounting the Second Circuit’s analysis in McGann and deciding to adopt its same
solution for assessing fees against a released prisoner), abrogated on other grounds by
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007); Taylor v. Luttrell, No. 06-2533, 2008 WL 4065927,
at *2–3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 27, 2008) (granting the plaintiff IFP status under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(1) and waiving the $350 filing fee without inquiring into whether the
plaintiff had funds available to pay the initial partial fee between the filing of the
complaint in August 2006 and his subsequent release).
88. 315 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2003).
89. Id. at 397.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 399 (“While preventing frivolous lawsuits is a legitimate reason for
requiring prisoners to overcome additional financial hurdles when filing suits, the
same rationale does not dictate that recently-released prisoners become instantly
liable for the remaining filing fee balance simply because they have been released.”).
94. See id.
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average indigent plaintiff in order to continue his lawsuit.”
The Fourth Circuit limited its holding to prisoners who make all
required installment payments while incarcerated, thereby deviating
96
from the McGann court’s more generous waiver procedure.
B. The Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits Have Authorized
§ 1915(b)(1)’s Application to Released Prisoners
Focusing on the PLRA’s purpose in deterring frivolous inmate
filings, the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits have interpreted
§ 1915(b) as imposing a continuing obligation on released prisoners
to satisfy the full filing fee. In Gay v. Texas Department of Corrections
97
State Jail Division, for example, the Fifth Circuit held that a prisonerplaintiff released during the pendency of his action must still fulfill
98
the PLRA’s filing fee requirements. After appealing a lower court
decision dismissing his pro se civil rights complaint, Gay filed a
motion to proceed under § 1915(a)(1), a supporting affidavit, and a
statement of account in which he alerted the court to his release from
99
prison and to his full-time enrollment at a community college.
The court concluded that the filing of a complaint or appeal triggers
the PLRA’s fee obligations because the plain language of
§ 1915(b)(1) requires a “prisoner” who “brings a civil action or files
100
an appeal” to “pay the full amount of the filing fee.”
The court
reasoned that “to bring” means “to file”—in other words,
notwithstanding his subsequent release, Gay still qualified as a
101
“prisoner” who had filed an appeal while incarcerated.
Based on
that conclusion and its desire “to put some teeth into” § 1915(b)’s
deterrent effect, the court remanded the case to the district court for
102
an assessment and collection of fees.
The court also directly addressed the McGann decision and stated
that it found “no support in the plain language of the PLRA” to
103
justify the Second Circuit’s construction of the filing fee provision.
The Fifth Circuit focused on § 1915(b)(1)’s mandate that one who
95. Id.
96. See id. at 398 (indicating that the trial court must fully review the litigant’s
financial data when considering his eligibility for an IFP waiver, including his
performance under the installment plan).
97. 117 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 1997).
98. Id. at 241.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 242.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 242 n.3 (remarking that the PLRA contains no provision instructing
courts to forgive a prisoner’s debt under the installment plan upon his release from
confinement).
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chooses to sue or appeal while incarcerated be held responsible for
the payment of the entire filing fee and dismissed the payment
104
formula outlined in § 1915(b)(2) as “one means of payment.”
Importantly, the court did not suggest any other means to assess fees
against an ex-prisoner nor did it indicate whether it would demand
lump sum payments. In addition, the court made no indication that
it would consider a prisoner’s prior compliance with the installment
105
plan when assessing fees, and lower courts have not done so.
The D.C. and Seventh Circuits adopted the Fifth Circuit’s
reasoning in part, explicitly holding that a prisoner’s obligation to
106
pay the full filing fee arises at the time of filing.
However, they
provided expanded analyses of the issue and considered the
relevance of a prisoner’s payment record while in custody. In In re
107
Smith, for example, the plaintiff had no income or assets when he
filed a petition against the United States Department of Justice and
the United States Parole Commission shortly before his release from
108
prison.
The D.C. Circuit began its analysis by evaluating his
109
The record
compliance with the PLRA’s relevant provisions.
revealed that he had failed to submit the prison account statements
required by § 1915(a)(2), pay the initial partial filing fee required by
§ 1915(b)(1), or make any of the monthly payments required by
110
§ 1915(b)(2).

104. Id. (quoting McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30–31 (2d Cir.
1996) (Miner, J., dissenting)).
105. See, e.g., Hunt v. Brannon, No. 06-00227, 2008 WL 553218, at *1 (S.D. Ala.
Feb. 22, 2008) (obligating the released prisoner-plaintiff to pay the entire $350 filing
fee without requesting or examining his commissary account records); Stone v.
Ferrell, No. 05-0062, 2007 WL 4589748, at *1 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 28, 2007) (ordering the
released prisoner-plaintiff to pay a balance of $147 without requesting or examining
his commissary account records).
106. See In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Because Smith was a
prisoner when he filed his petition, he is obligated to fulfill the applicable PLRA
procedural requirements and pay the amounts due under the statute,
notwithstanding the fact of his release.”); Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 898
(7th Cir. 1997) (differentiating between the plaintiff’s status as a prisoner at the time
of filing and his status as a non-prisoner at the time of trial).
107. 114 F.3d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
108. Id. at 1249. In his petition, Smith contended (1) that the Commission’s files
erroneously failed to reflect that the Commission ceased to have authority over him
on November 1, 1992; (2) that the Commission’s calculation of his parole date
violated § 235(b) of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473,
98 Stat. 1988 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2006)); (3) that the Federal
Bureau of Prisons ignored its own rules in calculating the length of his sentence;
(4) that the search of his residence violated his Fourth Amendment rights; and
(5) that his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective. Id.
109. Id. at 1251.
110. Id.
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In response, Smith contended that because § 1915(b)(1) and other
PLRA provisions refer exclusively to “prisoners,” the statute’s
111
Like the Fourth
requirements could not bind him upon release.
Circuit in DeBlasio, however, the court held that Smith’s current
inability to pay the applicable filing fee did not relieve him of his
obligation to comply with past due procedural and payment
112
obligations under the PLRA.
According to the court, failure to
113
comply with any of these requirements results in dismissal.
The court ultimately deferred any decision regarding Smith’s petition
114
until he complied with the PLRA filing fee requirements.
By limiting its holding to the facts of Smith’s case, the court left
unanswered the question of whether a prisoner who did meet his
PLRA obligations while in prison should have to continue to make
payments toward the filing fee after release.
The Seventh Circuit used a slightly different analysis in
determining a released prisoner’s continuing obligations under the
115
PLRA. In Robbins v. Switzer, the plaintiff initiated his lawsuit under
the PLRA’s installment plan but was subsequently released from
116
prison. He did not comply with the court’s orders requiring him to
provide a prison trust account statement or an affidavit showing his
117
Without
current resources and income pursuant to § 1915(a)(2).
the account statement, the court could not determine whether
118
Robbins owed any fees under the statutory formula. Therefore, the
court granted him twenty-one days to supply copies of the statement
so that it could determine the balance at the time he filed his notices
119
of appeal in addition to his income for the preceding six months.
Nevertheless, the court stated that an indigent former inmate was
obliged to pay those portions of the filing fee that he should have
remitted before his release, based on the balances in his prison trust
120
account at the time he filed the complaint or notice of appeal.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1251–52.
113. Id. at 1252 (remarking that prisoners cannot “evade the statute by
withholding required payments and win permanent reprieve from their obligations
by pleading poverty upon release”).
114. Id. (finding it appropriate to afford Smith time to comply with the filing fee
requirements because the circuit had not previously addressed the issue of the
PLRA’s applicability to a released petitioner).
115. 104 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 1997).
116. Id. at 896.
117. Id. at 898.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 898–99.
120. Id. The court further reasoned that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4), another section
of the PLRA known as the “safety-valve” provision, could enable released prisoners
who lack the necessary funds to pay the full filing fee to continue to litigate their
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III. PROPER INTERPRETATION OF THE PLRA’S PAYMENT REQUIREMENTS
Section 1915(b)(1)–(2) offers no solution to the procedural
problems its language creates, necessitating an examination of the
121
PLRA’s legislative history.
This history demonstrates that released
prisoners with no outstanding payments under the installment plan
can receive more lenient IFP treatment without offending the
122
purpose of the statute. Because Congress intended for the payment
requirement to counteract the advantages prisoners receive
throughout the litigation process, released prisoners can remain eligible
for traditional IFP status.

case. See id. at 898 (asserting that § 1915(b)(4) excuses “destitute” former prisoners
from further payment under the statutory formula). However, § 1915(b)(4) merely
states that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action
or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no
assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(4) (2006) (emphasis added). This section does not exonerate the plaintiff
from payment; it temporarily excuses only the initial partial sum required by
§ 1915(b)(1) at the time of filing. See Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 435
(7th Cir. 1997) (confirming that § 1915(b)(4) applies only to the initial partial filing
fee), abrogated on other grounds by Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000).
Section 1915(b)(4) would not help a former prisoner who managed to satisfy the
initial partial fee but could not afford to make subsequent payments.
121. The Supreme Court has established that legislative interpretation must begin
with an assessment of the plain language of the statutory provision at issue. See, e.g.,
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 104 (1993) (“Our task is to give effect to the will
of Congress, and where its will has been expressed in reasonably plain terms, that
language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489
U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (instructing that the plain meaning is conclusive “except in the
‘rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters’” (quoting Griffin, 458 U.S. at
571)). However, when Congress’s intent cannot be determined from the plain
wording of a statute, the Court has resorted to legislative history. See United States v.
Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154–55 (1932) (“In aid of the process of construction
we are at liberty, if the meaning be uncertain, to have recourse to the legislative
history of the measure and the statements by those in charge of it during its
consideration by the Congress.”). While some commentators and judges oppose
reliance on legislative history, others recognize its value in construing statutes.
See Stephen G. Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL.
L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (suggesting the value of legislative history in understanding a
statute’s “relevant context, conventions, and purpose”); John F. Manning,
The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2003) (endorsing the use of
legislative history in light of the fact that “Congress does not always accurately reduce
its intentions to words” and because “legislators necessarily draft statutes within the
constraints of bounded foresight, limited resources, and imperfect language”).
122. See infra Part IV (explaining that compliant ex-prisoners pose a lesser burden
on the judiciary because their willingness to make the installment payments indicates
their respect for the system).
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A. No Alternative Reading Can Reconcile the Inconsistency
in the PLRA’s Payment Formula
Congress likely intended for courts to interpret the terms
“prisoner” and “bring” in § 1915(b)(1) according to their plain
meanings. Section 1915(b)(1) begins with the sentence: “[I]f a
prisoner brings a civil action . . . the prisoner shall be required to pay
123
the full amount of a filing fee.”
Inmates released after filing a
complaint or appeal have contended that the PLRA’s obligations do
not apply to them because the Act refers exclusively to “prisoners”
who “bring” civil actions, suggesting that the payment obligations
instituted by § 1915(b)(1) only apply to litigants who remain
124
incarcerated for the duration of their lawsuits.
The statute itself
precludes alternative interpretations of the term “prisoner,” expressly
defining it as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is
accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent
for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole,
125
probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.”
In addition, based on its dictionary definition and relevant case
authority, “bring” as used in § 1915(b)(1) means to file an action in
court, not to see it through to a final disposition. Black’s Law
Dictionary provides that to “bring an action” means to institute legal
126
127
proceedings. Moreover, in Hoffman v. Blaski, the Supreme Court
interpreted the term’s meaning in the context of the federal venue
128
provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The venue statute permits the
transfer of “any civil action to any other district or division where it
129
might have been brought.” The petitioner in Hoffman argued that
the words “where it might have been brought” related not only to the
130
filing of the action, but also to the time of the transfer.
The Supreme Court rejected that position because the statutory
language was “unambiguous, direct, [and] clear” and interpreting
“might have been brought” to refer to anything other than the time
the lawsuit was filed would “do violence to the plain words of
131
[the statute].”
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (referencing the
petitioner’s argument that the PLRA’s elaborate payment scheme applies only to
prisoners).
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h) (emphasis added).
126. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 205 (8th ed. 2004).
127. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
128. Id. at 335.
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
130. 363 U.S. at 342.
131. Id. at 343–44.
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The Eleventh Circuit examined the term’s significance in a divided
en banc opinion addressing the application of the PLRA’s
132
controversial physical injury requirement to plaintiffs released from
133
custody before the completion of their lawsuit. In Harris v. Garner,
a six-judge majority held that § 1997e(e) applies to suits filed while a
134
The majority
plaintiff is in prison but decided after his release.
reasoned that the statute’s use of the term “brought” refers to the
filing or commencement of a lawsuit, not to its continuation, and
rejected the argument that the statute no longer applies to a
135
complaint once a plaintiff sheds prisoner status.
The court based
its interpretation on the premise that “Congress knows the settled
legal definition of the words it uses, and uses them in the settled
136
[legal] sense.”
Despite the fixed language of § 1915(b)(1), Congress
simultaneously created a detailed payment formula in § 1915(b)(2)
based on periodic withdrawals from a plaintiff’s commissary account
137
and articulated no alternative collection method. Therefore, while
§ 1915(b)(1) requires that its application depend on the
confinement status of the plaintiff at the time of commencing the
lawsuit or appeal, the language of § 1915(b)(2) provides no express
instructions on its application to released prisoners and calls for a
138
consideration of the PLRA’s legislative history.

132. The PLRA’s physical injury provision requires that prisoners suffer a physical
injury in order to recover for mental or emotional injuries caused by their subjection
to cruel and unusual punishment or other illegal conduct. See 42 U.S.C § 1997e(e)
(2006) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”).
133. 216 F.3d 970 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
134. Id. at 985.
135. See id. at 974 (drawing on court interpretations of the term in other statutes
and within the PLRA to support the premise that “brought” refers to the filing of a
suit). But see id. at 986 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(reasoning that § 1997e(e) should not apply to a pending complaint after a
prisoner’s release because requiring the newly freed plaintiff and defendant(s) to
start afresh in the litigation process would needlessly strain judicial resources while
failing to further the PLRA’s goals of reducing filings).
136. Id. at 974 (citing Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., 508 U.S. 152, 159
(1993)).
137. See McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 29–30 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“[N]ow that [the plaintiff] is no longer a prisoner, there is no prison account from
which to calculate and debit the required payments. Thus, a literal reading of all
provisions of the PLRA, as applied to released prisoners, is not possible.”).
138. See supra note 121 (discussing appropriate uses of legislative history in
statutory interpretation).
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B. IFP Status for Released, Compliant Prisoners Comports with
the Purpose and Legislative History of the PLRA
While allowing prisoners to evade their payment obligations before
release certainly offends the purpose of the PLRA, allowing
compliant ex-prisoners to seek and receive traditional IFP status after
release does not. An examination of the PLRA’s legislative history
reveals that deciding an indigent ex-prisoner’s obligation to pay more
money towards the filing fee on the basis of his pre-release
compliance with the installment plan, as opposed to the time of
139
filing, still fulfills the statute’s goals.
1. Courts must hold prisoners accountable for the debts that they incur
before release
As the courts in Gay and In re Smith noted, Congress amended the
IFP statute in an effort to alleviate the burden of frivolous inmate
complaints on the federal courts and to encourage a sense of
140
Indeed, proponents
financial responsibility in prisoners.
introduced the PLRA “to address the alarming explosion in the
141
number of frivolous lawsuits filed by State and Federal prisoners.”
Facing little opposition, they secured the statute’s passage after
142
minimal debate.
139. See infra Part III.B.1 (contending that examining a litigant’s pre-release
compliance with the PLRA still effectuates Congress’s desire to instill a sense of
financial responsibility in prisoners).
140. See, e.g., Gay v. Tex. Dep’t of Corr. State Jail Div., 117 F.3d 240, 241
(5th Cir. 1997) (proposing that Congress wanted the revised IFP procedure to serve
as a deterrent because “too many prisoners were filing too many frivolous or
repetitive lawsuits”); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Congress
‘endeavored to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation by making all prisoners seeking to
bring lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect created by liability for filing fees.’”
(internal brackets omitted) (quoting Leonard v. Lacy, 88 F.3d 181, 185
(2d Cir. 1996))); see also SAVE: COALITION TO STOP ABUSE AND VIOLENCE EVERYWHERE,
PROTECT VICTIMS OF RAPE AND OTHER ABUSES: REFORM THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM
ACT (PLRA) 5, http://www.savecoalition.org/pdfs/save_final_report.pdf (last visited
July 29, 2009) (“The theory behind this provision was to make prisoners ‘stop and
think’ before filing cases that might not be meritorious.”).
141. 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole); see also id. at 26,553
(statement of Sen. Hatch) (urging passage to “bring relief to a civil justice system
overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits”). The PLRA’s legislative history consists
mostly of legislators’ comments found in the Congressional Record and the
testimony of witnesses produced during hearings in the Senate and House of
Representatives. See Branham, supra note 49, at 487 n.12 (discussing the availability
of the PLRA’s legislative history).
142. See Benjamin v. Jacobson, 935 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[I]t is
worth noting that some believe that this legislation which has a far-reaching effect on
prison conditions and prisoners’ rights deserved to have been the subject of
significant debate. It was not.”); 142 CONG. REC. 5,193 (1996) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy) (“The PLRA was the subject of a single hearing in the Judiciary
Committee, hardly the type of thorough review that a measure of this scope
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The increase in inmate filings referenced by the PLRA’s
proponents came as a result of the gradual turnaround in judicial
143
Over time,
treatment of prisoner-plaintiffs identified in Part I.A.
these decisions, in combination with the passage of the CRIPA, gave
144
way to an upsurge in prisoner litigation.
Between the early 1980s
and the late 1990s, prisoner petitions rose from 23,230 to 68,235, an
145
increase of nearly 300%.
In addition to the increase in claims,
empirical and anecdotal evidence indicated that many claims were
146
This perceived onslaught in prisoner
meritless or frivolous.
litigation drew heavy criticism from “correctional officials . . .,
conservatives who opposed federal intervention in prison
administration, and legislators who argued that judges should refrain
deserves.”). But see Branham, supra note 49, at 538 (suggesting that Congress’s
treatment of the PLRA was not “atypical”).
143. See CLEAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 102 (remarking that giving prisoners access
to the courts to address their grievances politicized and “heightened prisoners’
consciousness”).
144. Id.
145. JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS FILED IN U.S.
DISTRICT COURTS, 2000, WITH TRENDS 1980–2000 1 (2002), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusd00.pdf. In her comprehensive study on inmate litigation,
Professor Margo Schlanger calculated that in 1995 inmates brought approximately
40,000 federal civil lawsuits, which accounted for nearly one-fifth of the federal civil
docket. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1558. Schlanger made her calculations using
statistics from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which records
data on a fiscal year basis. Id. at 1558 n.3.
146. See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (recounting
prisoner lawsuits that concerned issues such as insufficient locker space; defective
haircuts; invitations to a pizza party; and being served chunky instead of creamy
peanut butter); PALMER, supra note 14, at 391 (“Whether true or not, stories were
reported that prisons were nothing less than country clubs, where the prisoners
enjoyed a standard of living surpassing many citizens in free society, with luxuries
such as cable TV, catered food, and exercise facilities.”); Danielle M. McGill, Note,
To Exhaust or Not to Exhaust?: The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act Requires Prisoners to
Exhaust All Administrative Remedies Before Filing Excessive Force Claims in Federal Court,
50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 129, 130 n.4 (2003) (providing further examples of outlandish
prisoner claims); cf. Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1594 (noting that between 1990 and
1995, eighty percent or more of cases involving prisoner-plaintiffs ended in a pretrial
judgment for the defendant). Notably, commentators have advised that these
statistics and anecdotes fail to take into account the concomitant rise in the number
of prisoners as well as the reality that inmates are more likely to have their trials
dismissed for non-substantive reasons such as failure to pay a filing fee or to make a
timely response to a court request. See Lyon v. Krol, 127 F.3d 763, 766 n.6 (8th Cir.
1997) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (“A list of reasons for any increase in the number of
complaints . . . would likely include the high incidence of prison overcrowding, a
lack of carefully trained correctional officers, and inadequate and frequently unfair
internal grievance procedures.”); Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1568 (charging that the
critics of inmate litigation “used stylized anecdotes and gerrymandered statistics” to
push the litigation-reform effort); Greg Moran, Cruel and Unusual: Where Does
Punishment End and Cruelty Begin?, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 9, 1996, at A1
(“The high dismissal rate of prisoner lawsuits . . . is not solely due to frivolous filings,
but to potentially valid claims that are thrown out for minute procedural or technical
reasons.”).
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147

from making public policy.” The PLRA instituted major procedural
148
barriers to the filing of prisoner lawsuits to stem this rise in cases.
In light of this history, the McGann court and its followers in the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have frustrated congressional intent by
failing to examine a released prisoner’s payment records and prerelease compliance. Congress designed the statute’s filing fee
provisions to reduce frivolous prisoner litigation “by making all
prisoners seeking to bring lawsuits or appeals feel the deterrent effect
149
created by liability for filing fees.” Congress believed that the lack
of economic disincentives to filing meritless cases had contributed to
150
the proliferation of prisoner litigation.
Without addressing the
issue of prior compliance, the Second Circuit focused its analysis
151
exclusively on the potential effects of requiring ongoing payment.
Excusing a released prisoner’s failure to comply with the installment
plan while still incarcerated encourages all prisoners nearing
152
completion of their sentences to eschew the payment process.
As the court in Robbins v. Switzer noted, “[t]he Act’s effectiveness
would be eroded if, during their final year of custody, prisoners could
file suits and appeals without considering the financial consequences,
planning to ignore the statute while in custody, divert trust account
153
funds to other purposes, and plead poverty upon release.”
Therefore, allowing inmates who never authorized prison
administrators to submit the requisite monthly payments on their

147. See CLEAR ET AL., supra note 17, at 102 (commenting that these groups pushed
for legislation that would both curb prisoner filings and minimize judicial micromanagement of state and federal prisons).
148. The PLRA contains ten sections that amended several different provisions of
the United States Code. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2006) (requiring district
courts to weed out prisoner claims that clearly lack merit); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)
(restricting attorneys’ fees); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (prohibiting claims for emotional
injury without a prior showing of physical injury). Recent empirical evidence
confirms the statute’s effectiveness in reducing prisoner filings. See Roosevelt,
supra note 50, at 1779 (“[T]o the extent that success can be measured by the volume
of suits, the PLRA has worked.”).
149. In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Leonard v. Lacy,
88 F.3d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1996)).
150. See Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Congress deemed
prisoners to be pestiferous litigants because they have so much free time on their
hands and there are few costs to filing suit.”); 141 CONG. REC. 14,572 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (reasoning that the new filing fee requirement “will force
prisoners to think twice about the case and not just file reflexively”).
151. See McGann v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 96 F.3d 28, 30 (2d Cir. 1996)
(voicing concern that imposing continuing payment obligations on released
prisoners would lead to an “onerous” result because it might require them to pay the
balance of the filing fee in one large installment).
152. See id. at 31 (Miner, J., dissenting) (“[I]t just makes no sense to me to allow a
prisoner to take the balance in his prison account with him upon his release . . . .”).
153. 104 F.3d 895, 899 (7th Cir. 1997).
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behalf to nonetheless continue their case in federal court upon
release conflicts with the legislature’s expressed desire to infuse a
sense of accountability in prisoners.
2. Granting traditional IFP status to compliant ex-prisoners supports the
PLRA’s goals
Although the legislative history of the PLRA does not contain any
specific comment on its applicability to released prisoners, it plainly
discloses that Congress sought to distinguish incarcerated from nonincarcerated litigants because the former encounter fewer obstacles
154
throughout the litigation process. Congress did not intend for the
PLRA to inhibit the right of access of indigents not cared for by the
155
state, a category that includes released prisoners.
While in custody, prisoners depend on the government for their
156
means of subsistence.
As Senator Jon Kyl noted in his floor
statement:
Unlike other prospective litigants who seek poor person status,
prisoners have all the necessities of life supplied, including the
materials required to bring their lawsuits. For a prisoner who
qualifies for poor person status, there is no cost to bring a suit and,
therefore, no incentive to limit suits to cases that have some chance
157
of success.

Kyl further observed that because inmates have their basic material
needs provided at state expense, and because they are further
provided with free paper, postage, and legal assistance, “[f]iling
frivolous . . . lawsuits has become a recreational activity for long-term

154. See Witzke v. Femal, 376 F.3d 744, 750 (7th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the
PLRA targets current as opposed to former prisoners because they “encounter a
uniquely low opportunity cost relative to the typical litigant”).
155. See supra Part I.C (establishing that the PLRA did not alter the IFP procedure
for non-incarcerated indigent litigants).
156. See Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1285 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that the
government provides prisoners with the “essentials of life” (quoting Evans v. Croom,
650 F.2d 521, 523 (4th Cir. 1981))). In evaluating prisoners’ unique relationship
with the government, the Supreme Court has noted:
For state prisoners, eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and playing
are all done under the watchful eye of the State . . . . What for a private
citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his
tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a
dispute with the State.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973). Consequently, prisoners have
gradually garnered a reputation as frequent, frivolous filers. See Cleavinger v. Saxner,
474 U.S. 193, 211 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“With less to profitably occupy
their time than potential litigants on the outside, and with a justified feeling that they
have much to gain and virtually nothing to lose, prisoners appear to be far more
prolific litigants than other groups in the population.”).
157. 141 CONG. REC. 14,572–73 (1995).
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158

residents of our prisons.” In addition, as many commentators have
159
noted, prisoners have greater incentives to file frivolous lawsuits.
Based on these realities and the statistical evidence discussed above,
Congress concluded that inmate abuse of the federal judicial system
160
was likely to continue absent significant changes to the IFP statute.
While proponents of the PLRA did not want to prevent inmates
161
from bringing meritorious suits, they were concerned that prisoners
put an especially heavy burden on courts’ civil dockets while
162
incurring few opportunity costs. For example, Senator Harry Reid
opined that the judicial system allowed prisoners to maintain
frivolous litigation with the state and provided them not only “an upto-date library and a legal assistant,” but also “three square meals a
day” and the ability to “watch cable TV in the rec room or lift weights
163
in a nice modern gym” if they “get tired of legal research.” Senator
Orrin Hatch commented that “[j]ailhouse lawyers with little else to
do are tying our courts in knots with an endless flood of frivolous
164
litigation.”
Inmates can litigate in the first place because, in addition to
providing food, medical care, and shelter, prisons also supply them
with various legal resources in accordance with the landmark Bounds

158. Id. at 14,572.
159. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 327 (1972) (stating that prisoners have unique
incentives to file meritless or frivolous lawsuits because they can obtain a “short
sabbatical in the nearest federal courthouse”); 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (“[A] courtroom is certainly a more hospitable place to
spend an afternoon than a prison cell.”).
160. See 141 CONG. REC. 26,548 (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole) (lamenting that
frivolous prisoner lawsuits “waste valuable legal resources” and characterizing the
PLRA as a necessary measure to curtail massive abuse of the judicial process);
Schlanger, supra note 1, at 1567–68 (commenting that the PLRA’s supporters viewed
inmate litigation as “a wasteful system demanding drastic amendment, even
all-but-complete elimination”).
161. See 142 CONG. REC. 5,118 (1996) (statement of Sen. Reid) (“If somebody has a
good case, a prisoner, let him file it.”); 141 CONG. REC. 27,042 (1995) (statement of
Sen. Hatch) (“I do not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims.
This legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised.”). But see Winslow,
supra note 14, at 1666–67 (“Absent from the vociferous dialogue regarding frivolous
and meritless prisoner lawsuits was any significant discussion about meritorious
prisoner suits and the constitutional protections afforded to prisoners.”).
Meritorious prisoner claims tend to address issues such as inadequate medical
treatment, overcrowding, unsanitary and dilapidated facilities, lack of physical
security, and administrative transfer or segregation without due process. See Roger
Roots, Of Prisoners and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers: A Tale of Two Litigation Reform Efforts,
38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 210, 221–22 (2002) (discussing examples of successful civil
rights suits brought by pro se inmate-litigants).
162. 141 CONG. REC. 26,553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (urging passage to
“bring relief to a civil justice system overburdened by frivolous prisoner lawsuits”).
163. Id. at 27,043.
164. Id. at 26,553.
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165

v. Smith decision.
Common methods of attempting to provide
inmates with meaningful court access include establishing and
166
maintaining an up-to-date law library, employing assistants in the
167
168
169
library and persons trained in the law, and providing supplies.
Moreover, as a result of Johnson v. Avery, incarcerated litigants can
170
receive assistance from other inmates. These materials effectuate a
prisoner’s right of access not just at the time of filing, but from
171
commencement of the suit until its conclusion.
Prisoners released during the pendency of their suit lose access to
the resources once available to them in the prison facility and
immediately begin to face the same costs of prosecuting their action
172
as non-prisoners. To litigate in federal court, indigent non-prisoners
can secure IFP status without enduring the complicated installment
173
plan, and indigent prisoners in the custody of the state generally do
165. See 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (instructing that the state can discharge its
obligation either by providing an adequate library or by providing inmates with
access to attorneys or other persons trained in the law to assist them).
166. Library necessities include relevant state and federal statutes and federal law
reporters. See, e.g., Corgain v. Miller, 708 F.2d 1241, 1250–52 (7th Cir. 1983)
(requiring state law materials); Cruz v. Hauck, 627 F.2d 710, 720 (5th Cir. 1980)
(requiring Federal Supplements); see also Wade v. Kane, 448 F. Supp. 678, 684
(E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 591 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring current volumes of
United States Reports and current copies of the state criminal code).
167. See, e.g., Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F. Supp. 1309, 1318–19 (D. Ariz. 1988),
aff’d, 951 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1991) (ordering direct assistance for a prisoner whose
minimal knowledge of the English language prevented him from properly preparing
his claims).
168. See Bounds, 430 U.S. at 831 (“Among the alternatives are the training of
inmates as paralegal assistants to work under lawyers’ supervision, the use of
paraprofessionals and law students, either as volunteers or in formal clinical
programs, the organization of volunteer attorneys through bar associations or other
groups, the hiring of lawyers on a part-time consultant basis, and the use of full-time
staff attorneys . . . .”).
169. Gluth, 773 F. Supp. at 1321 (reasoning that writing instruments effectuate
meaningful access by helping prisoners prepare and deliver acceptable court
papers).
170. Courts have struck down rules that unreasonably interfere with the essential
work of jailhouse lawyers. See, e.g., In re Harrell, 470 P.2d 640, 647 (Cal. 1970)
(invalidating a rule that prevented a jailhouse lawyer from keeping a client’s legal
papers in his cell).
171. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F.2d 800, 810 (9th Cir. 1991) (Wiggins, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (“[W]ithout legal assistance or library access at all stages
of a proceeding, an inmate’s right of access to the courts is not effective or
meaningful.”); Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 623 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that
meaningful access includes access to legal resources for post-filing needs).
172. See Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321, 323 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that an
indigent’s release from prison triggers an immediate rise in litigating costs because
the state no longer provides for him). See generally JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS
COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY 112–25 (2003) (describing the
employment and financial difficulties prisoners encounter upon their release from
prison).
173. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2006) (bestowing discretion on federal courts to
authorize IFP status for non-prisoner litigants).
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not have to “make the choice between [their] lawsuit[s] and the
174
necessities of life in the same manner that a non-prisoner would.”
Indigent ex-prisoners—no longer benefitting from free legal resources
and having to provide for themselves—again need the assistance of
traditional IFP status to maintain court access.
IV. A UNIFORM APPLICATION OF § 1915 TO RELEASED PRISONERS
Because the installment pay plan contemplates a mechanism at the
prison for collecting a part of the filing fee and remitting it to the
175
court, its requirements and safeguards cannot apply equally to
176
Courts have consistently upheld the PLRA’s
released prisoners.
amendments to the federal IFP statute—as applied to incarcerated
177
litigants—against various constitutional challenges.
According to
these decisions, the filing fee requirements placed on prisoners
under § 1915(b) “do not deprive them of adequate, effective, and
178
meaningful [court] access.” Although the new provisions make IFP
proceedings more onerous for prisoners than for other classes of
indigent plaintiffs, Congress can impose such conditions without
179
violating the Constitution.
174. Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2002).
175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) (2006) (“The agency having custody of the
prisoner shall forward payments from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court
. . . .”).
176. See supra Part III.A (establishing the deficiencies in the plain language of
§ 1915(b)(1)–(2)).
177. Courts have reasoned that the PLRA’s fee requirements do not violate
prisoners’ First Amendment right to engage in the expressive conduct of litigation,
as a prisoner who complies with the periodic payment schedule still has access to the
federal court system.
See, e.g., Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286
(6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that Congress’s refusal to subsidize a prisoner’s exercise
of his First Amendment rights does not constitute a violation of those rights).
Courts have also held that § 1915(b) satisfies equal protection standards. See Tucker
v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reasoning that Congress’s
legitimate interest in curbing meritless litigation provides a rational basis for treating
prisoners and non-prisoners dissimilarly); Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286–87 (refusing to
apply strict scrutiny because prisoners are not a suspect class and finding that the
filing fee requirement rationally relates to legitimate governmental interests in
curtailing frivolous tort and civil rights litigation). These same courts have further
concluded that liability for the full filing fee does not deny prisoners either
procedural or substantive due process. See Tucker, 142 F.3d at 1299 (holding that
periodic payments do not constitute an “insurmountable barrier” to litigating a case
and therefore do not violate any right, privilege, or immunity safeguarded by the
Constitution or federal statute); Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1287–88 (finding that the
statute satisfies the constitutional requirements of procedural due process because
although prisoners have a protected property interest in their money, the filing fee
requirement does not absolutely deprive them of their assets).
178. Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1284.
179. See Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 874
(1997) (“[T]he right of access to federal courts is not a free-floating right, but rather
is subject to Congress’ Article III power to set limits on federal jurisdiction.”).
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In support of this conclusion, courts have reasoned that the PLRA
affords prisoners certain procedural safeguards that mitigate the
180
Under this rationale, the
burden of the filing fee requirement.
PLRA revisions of the IFP statute do not qualify as an absolute bar to
court access because prisoners can apply to use the installment plan
under § 1915(b), which allows them to pay the filing fee in smaller
monthly sums and therefore constitutes a minimal financial
181
182
burden.
In Hampton v. Hobbs, for example, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned that although the prisoner had to pay an initial partial filing
fee and monthly payments thereafter, other provisions of the statute
183
tempered those requirements significantly. As examples, the court
cited the sections allowing the initial fee to be collected only “when
funds exist” and the monthly payments to be deducted only when the
184
prisoner’s account balance exceeds ten dollars.
If courts required indigent prisoners to pay an unaffordable lump
sum upon release to continue their lawsuit—a possibility that the
McGann court feared and none of the opposing circuits have
explicitly rejected—those prisoners would in effect be “denied a
reasonable opportunity to petition the court because the fee, and
185
therefore access, would be beyond their reach.”
The rationales
used in Hampton and similar cases do not hold merit if prisoners
cannot apply for traditional IFP status upon release because, without
an institutional account to facilitate payment, the litigant lacks the
ten dollar and twenty percent safeguards of § 1915(b)(1)–(2).
In order to maintain the constitutionality of § 1915(b) as applied
to released prisoners while also preserving Congress’s goals in
enacting the PLRA, all circuits should adopt the middle-ground
186
approach used in cases like DeBlasio v. Gilmore. Thus, courts should
assess a released prisoner’s trust account statements before dismissing

180. See Tucker, 142 F.3d at 1298 (commenting that the PLRA never exacts more
than twenty percent of an indigent prisoner’s assets or income); Lucien v. DeTella,
141 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that the PLRA authorizes only periodic
collections from prisoners’ commissary accounts).
181. See 141 CONG. REC. 14,573 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (“The filing fee is small
enough not to deter a prisoner with a meritorious claim, yet large enough to deter
frivolous claims and multiple filings.”).
182. 106 F.3d 1281 (6th Cir. 1997).
183. Id. at 1284.
184. Id.
185. Simone Schonenberger, Note, Access Denied: The Prison Litigation Reform Act,
86 KY. L.J. 457, 465 (1997) (discussing the potential negative effect of one large fee
payment on the ability of incarcerated litigants to maintain access to the courts).
186. See 315 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 2003) (evaluating a former prisoner’s qualification
for in forma pauperis status before deciding whether he owed filing fees for a civil
action commenced while he was in prison).
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his action or appeal for failure to pay the full filing fee. If the court
determines that the released prisoner had the financial means to pay
any part of the PLRA fees, he must pay such amounts that, according
to the prison account statements, he could have paid when he filed
his petition in court and in subsequent installments; if he does not
pay his outstanding debts, the court should dismiss his complaint for
188
failure to comply with its order. If the prisoner demonstrates that,
after filing the complaint or notice of appeal, he either (1) satisfied
all of his installment payments or (2) lacked the assets to pay any
portion of the filing fee, the court should allow him to apply for
traditional IFP status and then proceed to address his petition.
This solution furthers the PLRA’s goals of reducing frivolous suits
189
in federal courts and improving their quality. If the prisoner abides
by payment deadlines and forwards available funds, and then seeks to
continue to litigate the case after release from prison, the likelihood
190
that his claim is frivolous dissipates. In addition, many courts have
limited the scope of § 1915(a)(1) so that, at most, it waives the filing
fee and other court-imposed costs and requires the IFP litigant to
personally finance other aspects of the litigation process such as
191
depositions and transcripts.
Thus, if former prisoners choose to
continue litigating upon their release, they have engaged in the exact
type of economic decision-making that Congress hoped to
192
encourage.
Lastly, this formula strikes a proper balance between the
government’s interest in deterring inmates from filing meritless suits
and prisoners’ interests in having access to a forum in which they can
vindicate their rights. Under this scheme, an individual’s release
from prison does not excuse his prior noncompliance with § 1915(b),
but it also does not immediately trigger an absolute obligation to pay
any outstanding balance of the filing fee. Even though the prisoner
187. See supra Part II.A (describing the procedure endorsed by the Fourth
Circuit).
188. See Robbins v. Switzer, 104 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasizing the
need to examine a released inmate’s trust account to identify any outstanding debts).
189. See supra Part III.B (describing Congress’s objectives in enacting the PLRA).
190. See Roosevelt, supra note 50, at 1779 n.53 (suggesting that an inmate whose
suit is frivolous “presumably has less at stake and will be less willing to pay a filing
fee” as a condition of proceeding in federal court).
191. See cases cited supra note 45.
192. Courts could subject the ex-prisoner’s financial condition to continuous
review during the remainder of the lawsuit and require him to pay—to the extent
possible—all or part of the filing fee if he acquired a sufficient source of income.
Before the PLRA, some courts revoked leave to proceed IFP if evidence indicated
that the plaintiff’s economic situation had improved. See Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d
191, 197 (10th Cir. 1996) (requiring the plaintiff to pay service and mileage costs
after the court confirmed that he no longer qualified for pauper status).
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can continue his lawsuit without further payment of fees, the court
still holds him responsible for any installment payments that came
due before release, thereby instilling a sense of financial
responsibility.
CONCLUSION
Before the PLRA’s enactment, district courts retained broad
discretion to grant or deny IFP petitions from incarcerated and non193
incarcerated litigants.
The PLRA amendments have confined this
discretion by mandating that courts assess and collect filing fees from
194
prisoners bringing civil suits. Although the PLRA’s drafters hoped
that these amendments would simplify the IFP procedure and reduce
the workload of the federal judiciary, courts have expended time and
resources to resolve § 1915’s ambiguities each time a prisoner seeks
195
to continue a pending lawsuit upon release.
According to the most recent data available, 713,473 prisoners
were released during 2006, an increase of 2.1% from the number
196
197
released in 2005.
The recent increase in the federal filing fee
amplifies the need for a uniform solution to the procedural issues
presented by § 1915. The higher the fee, the longer it will take for
prisoners to complete the installment plan, making it more likely that
they will be released before finishing payment.
Deciding released prisoners’ continuing payment obligations
according to their debts under the PLRA’s fee formula provides a
straight-forward procedure for courts to follow and fulfills the
statute’s purpose in deterring meritless lawsuits. As the PLRA’s
legislative history demonstrates, Congress sought to create a more
demanding payment procedure for prisoners because of the unique
advantages their living arrangement provides. When a litigant leaves

193. See, e.g., Pace v. Evans, 709 F.2d 1428, 1429 (11th Cir. 1983) (commenting
that a trial court could deny an application for leave to proceed IFP as long as it did
not act arbitrarily or deny the petition on erroneous grounds).
194. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)–(2) (2006) (requiring district courts to make a
series of factual findings regarding the prisoner’s monthly account balances or
deposits in the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint as a basis for
collecting fees).
195. See Branham, supra note 49, at 543 (commenting that “courts [have been]
confronted [with numerous questions] regarding the PLRA’s meaning [and] scope”
even though the statute was “purportedly designed to curb the burdens of inmate
litigation”).
196. WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007 4 (2008), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
pim07.pdf.
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (2006) (increasing the federal filing fee from $250 to
$350).
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prison having satisfied all past due payment obligations, nothing
differentiates him from the general population except his criminal
record. If he desires to continue his lawsuit, he poses no greater risk
than any other non-incarcerated citizen who seeks a traditional IFP
waiver. Having met the PLRA’s deadlines, his status as an ex-prisoner
should not determine his right of access; rather, his compliance with
the statute should entitle him to apply for IFP assistance under
§ 1915(a)(1).

